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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Criminal Law-Evidence--Admissibility of Post Arraignment Con-
fessions
In Killough v. United States' the defendant was arrested for the
murder of his wife and held for thirty-four hours before arraignment,
during which time he signed a written confession. He was then
taken before a magistrate and advised of his right to have counsel
and to remain silent.2 The preliminary hearing was then adjourned
for twenty days to allow him to obtain counsel and to enable counsel
time to prepare a defense. He was then committed to jail. Twenty
hours after arraignment, and before he had obtained counsel, de-
fendant voluntarily agreed to a visit by one of the police officers to
whom he had confessed the previous day. The purpose of the
officer's visit was not to obtain an affirmation of the previous con-
fession, but to return articles of clothing and to secure a burial release
of the wife's body. During the conversation defendant orally con-
fessed to the crime. The trial court excluded the written confession
under the McNabb'-Upshaw4 -Mallory5 line of cases. However, the
court found the oral confession made after arraignment to have been
voluntary and properly admissible. Defendant was found guilty of
manslaughter and appealed. The court of appeals reversed, holding
the second confession inadmissible as a "fruit of the first."'
Rule 5 (a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure7 provides
'No. 16398, D.C. Cir., Oct. 4, 1962.
2 "(a) Appearance before the Commissioner. An officer making an arrest
under a warrant issued upon a complaint or any person making an arrest
without a warrant shall take the arrested person without unnecessary delay
before the nearest available commissioner or before any other nearby officer
empowered to commit persons charged with offenses against the laws of the
United States. When a person arrested without a warrant is brought before
a commissioner or other officer, a complaint shall be filed forthwith. (b)
Statement by the Commissioner. The commissioner shall inform the de-
fendant of the complaint against him, of his right to retain counsel and of his
right to have a preliminary examination. He shall also inform the defendant
that he is not required to make a statement and that any statement made by
him may be used against him. The commissioner shall allow the defendant
reasonable time and opportunity to consult counsel and shall admit the de-
fendant to bail as provided in these rules." FED. R. CRim. P. 5.
8 McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
" Upshaw v. United States, 335 U.S. 410 (1948).
Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957).
' Compare Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939), and Silver-
thorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920), where the "fruit
of the poisonous tree" idea is introduced with respect to wiretap evidence
and search and seizure.
' See note 2 supra.
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that an arrested person must be taken without unnecessary delay
before a commissioner or other officer for arraignment. The
McNabb-Mallory doctrine renders invalid in federal courts any con-
fession obtained during an unnecessary delay before arraignment.'
The principal case makes a significant extension of the scope and
spirit of this exclusionary rule by holding that a confession taken
after proper arraignment can also be inadmissible if it is not inde-
pendent of invalid pre-arraignment admission.
Neither the McNabb-Mallory line of decisions nor the principal
case rests on constitutional grounds.'0 This exclusionary rule is a
product of the Supreme Court's supervisory power over the lower
federal courts." The purpose of the rule is to enforce the congres-
sional requirement of prompt arraignment by excluding evidence
gained by its violation, and to prevent police from using unwarranted
detention to extract confessions by methods "easily gliding into the
evils of 'the third degree.' ,12
Under both the McNabb-Mallory doctrine and its extension in
Killough the confession may be completely voluntary and yet in-
admissible.'" Thus, in pre-arraignment confessions the key factor
in determining admissibility is whether or not the confession came
during a period of unnecessary delay. When, as in Killough, a post-
arraignment confession follows an invalid pre-arraignment confes-
' This rule does not apply to state criminal prosecutions. Brown v. Allen,
344 U.S. 443, 476 (1953); Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55, 64 (1951).
'Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957) ; Upshaw v. United States,
335 U.S. 410 (1948); McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 322 (1943). See
generally Hogan & Snee, The McNabb-Mallory Rule: Its Rise, Rationale
and Rescue, 47 GEo. L.J. 1 (1958). The McNabb-Mallory rule has met with
much criticism. E.g., Inbau, The Confession Dilemma in the United States
Supreme Court, 43 ILL. L. REv. 442 (1948); Comment, 42 Micu. L. REv. 679
(1944). Such criticism would also apply to an extension of the rule.
10 "No one even suggests that any right under the constitution is involved."
Killough v. United States, No. 16398, D.C. Cir., Oct. 4, 1962, at 25 (dissent).
Compare Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), where evidence obtained by
illegal search and seizure was held inadmissible in state courts on constitu-
tional grounds.
1 1McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
12 Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 453 (1957) ; See 47 VA. L. REv.
884 (1961).
3 Upshaw v. United States, 335 U.S. 410 (1948); Killough v. United
States, No. 16398, D.C. Cir., Oct. 4, 1962. An involuntary confession is
inadmissible in federal courts under the fifth amendment. Brain v. United
States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897). The fourteenth amendment renders invalid
an involuntary confession in state criminal prosecutions. Lisenba v. Cali-
fornia, 314 U.S. 219 (1941); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940);
Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
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sion the criteria of admissibility is whether or not the second is
independent of the first. 4
The principal case attempts to prevent police from obtaining a
confession by violating McNabb-Mallory, yet reaping all the benefits
by a reaffirmation following arraignment.15 Too often the reaffirma-
tion will be a mere mechanical act 6 by a prisoner who, having con-
fessed, can see no harm in repeating what he has already said. The
Court recognized this problem in United States v. Bayer'4 when it
stated:
[A] fter an accused has once let the cat out of the bag by con-
fessing, no matter what the inducement, he is never there-
after free of the psychological and practical disadvantages of
having confessed. He can never get the cat back in the bag.
The secret is out for good. In such a sense, a later confession
always may be looked upon as a fruit of the first.
Thus in order to preserve the McNabb-Mallory rule it is necessary to
curb in some degree the use of post-arraignment confessions.
As a possible solution it has been suggested that the defendant's
second confession should not be allowed unless it clearly appears that
he knew that his first confession was not admissible against him.' 8
This test would do much to prevent police circumvention of McNabb-
Mallory. But this solution is inadequate since the arraigning magis-
trate cannot conclusively determine the admissibility of the first
confession and is, therefore, not in a position to give the prisoner a
positive warning, 19 nor can the police be expected to so warn him.
When faced with this problem the court cannot lay down an inflexible
rule but must look at the totality of the circumstances in each case. 20
The court must weigh certain factors and determine whether the
" Killough v. United States, supra note 13 (concurring opinion).
1 In Killough the majority quotes a portion of the record from Naples
v. United States, 307 F.2d 618 (D.C. Cir. 1962), in which police admitted
that a post-arraignment reaffirmation was obtained for fear that the first
confession would be excluded under McNabb-Mallory. The case was reversed
on other grounds.
"In Jackson v. United States, 273 F.2d 521 (D.C. Cir. 1959), the de-
fendant merely signed a typewritten copy of an invalid oral confession." 331 U.S. 532, 540 (1947).
18 McCoRMIcK, EVIDENCE § 114,, at 237 (1954) ; Note, 26 TEXAs L. REV.
536 (1948).
19Note, 70 YALE L.J. 298, 304 n.30 (1960).
20 This is the court's procedure in determining whether a confession is
involuntary and thus a violation of due process. Payne v. Arkansas, 356
U.S. 560 (1958); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940).
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second confession can be considered separate from and independent
of the first.
One of the factors to be considered is the time between arraign-
ment and the second confession. Jackson v. United States2 held a
post-arraignment confession invalid because it was not independent
of the pre-arraignment confession. Here the defendant made an oral
confession which was invalid under McNabb-Mallory. He was then
arraigned and immediately returned to police headquarters where
within one hour he signed a typewritten copy of his prior confes-
sion. Defendant had no chance to consult counsel. The typewritten
confession was held inadmissible because it could not be considered
an independent act based upon proper counsel or occurring after
time for deliberate reflection. On the other hand, United States v.
Bayer22 holds that a confession invalid under McNabb does not per-
petually bar the defendant from making an admissible subsequent
confession. Here the confession came six months after the first and
was admitted.
It would seem that no minimum time can be set. More time may
be necessary where defendant was actually a victim of physical or
mental coercion before arraignment." Thus the court should deter-
mine from all the circumstances whether there was sufficient time
for defendant to grasp the significance of the magistrate's warning.
A second factor to be considered is whether or not the defendant
had the advice of counsel before making his second confession. Lack
of counsel should not of itself destroy the second confession, since
the prisoner has had judicial instruction as to his rights.2" How-
ever, advice by counsel in addition to a magistrate's warning should
make a defendant well aware of his rights and tend to show an in-
dependent confession. In both Goldsmith v. United States25 and
Jackson v. United States26 the holding that a second confession was
independent, and therefore admissible, turned largely on the presence
and advice of counsel. In Goldsmith defendant's invalid pre-arraign-
21273 F.2d 521 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
"2331 U.S. 532 (1947).
28 Under McNabb-Mallory the pre-arraignment confession need not actu-
ally be involuntary so there may be no coercive influence to carry over to
the second confession. Note, 70 YALE L.J. 298 (1960). Compare Thomas
v. Arizona, 356 U.S. 390 (1958); Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596 (1944).
"4 FED. R. CRim. P. 5 (b).
2277 F.2d 335 (D.C. Cir. 1960), 74 HAIv. L. Rnv. 1222 (1961).
28 285 F.2d 675 (D.C. Cir. 1960). This is the second appeal of Jackson v.
United States, 273 F.2d 521 (1959), 47 VA. L. R v. 884 (1961).
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ment confessions were reaffirmed only one hour after proper arraign-
ment. However during this hour defendant had a fifteen minute
consultation with an attorney. In Jackson the defendant was ar-
raigned on Sunday and the admissible affirmation of his confession
occurred on Tuesday. Defendant had benefit of consultation with
his attorney and consented in writing to the Tuesday interview with
the police.-"
A spontaneous or unsolicited confession or affirmation should
also weigh heavily in determining if the second confession is inde-
pendent of the first.2" While it is true that the defendant may be
facing police who know his secret, it would seem that an unsolicited,
spontaneous admission would likely be independent of the first
confession.
The person to whom the second confession is made should also
be considered. 9 If the reaffirmation is made to officers who heard
the invalid first confession the problem of the prisoner's psychological
disadvantage is clearly present.30 Conversely, if the second con-
fession is to one whom the prisoner knows or believes is not aware of
the first confession, this should raise an inference of independence.
Additional factors to be considered include the age, background and
mental capacity of the defendant,3" and whether he gave the officer
hearing the second confession permission to visit his jail cell., 2
Absence of counsel and brevity of time seem to be the main ele-
ments relied on by the majority of the court in Killough. Indeed, if
the spirit of the majority is followed advice of counsel seems to be
almost a prerequisite of independence. On the other hand, it seems
clear that the majority does not accord much weight to the judicial
warning given to the prisoner. Considering all of the circumstances
in the principal case the court made a very liberal determination of
the lack of independence of the confession in question. In fact, aside
2 The court in Killough distinguishes the present case mainly on the
fact that the defendant had no advice of counsel. However, four judges
intimate they would overrule Goldsmith and the second Jackson case if neces-
sary A fifth urges that they be overruled.
; Goldsmith v. United States, 277 F.2d 335 (D.C. Cir. 1960). Cf. Stroble
v. California, 343 U.S. 181, 191 (1952).
2" In Killough the second confession was made to an officer who had heard
the first. Cf. Jackson v. State, 209 Md. 390, 121 A.2d 242 (1956).
"0 See note 17 supra and accompanying text.
"' Cf. Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940).




from lack of counsel, most of the circumstances would seem to indi-
cate an independent confession.
In confession cases the court is faced with the problem of the
balancing of civil liberties with the need for effective police pro-
tection." The idea of a coerced confession is abhorrent. On the
other hand, the guilty should not escape punishment because of a
mere technicality. In the principal case individual rights are weighed
heavily at the expense of police effectiveness. If the spirit of this
decision is followed the McNabb-Mallory rule is clearly in no danger
of being circumvented by post-arraignment police activities.
CHARLES M. WHEDBEE
Criminal Procedure-Continuance
It is the policy of the law that controversies should be settled as
speedily as possible.1 In criminal cases this right is guaranteed to
the accused by the constitution.' However, undue speed may often
work as much or more injustice as unnecessary delay.' To insure a
prisoner adequate time to prepare his defense a continuance may
often be necessary. In a criminal trial in North Carolina the grant-
ing or denial of a motion for a continuance of a case to another term
or until later in the same term is a decision which rests within the
sound discretion of the trial judge.4 Normally continuance of a
criminal case is not favored.5
The statutory pattern for continuance of any cause is extremely
broad.6 Generally, continuances may be granted if the judge is
satisfied that though the applicant has diligently prepared his case,
it would be impossible for the moving party to have a fair trial at
the present term for reasons beyond his control. No universal
enumeration of the grounds for a continuance is possible, since the
sufficiency of the cause is dependent upon and interwoven with the
" See Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 453 (1957).
'Piedmont Wagon Co. v. Bostic, 118 N.C. 758, 24 S.E. 525 (1896).'U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI.
'State v. Creech, 229 N.C. 662, 677, 51 S.E.2d 348, 359 (1949) (dissent).
' State v. Flowers, 244 N.C. 77, 92 S.E.2d 447 (1956); State v. Ipock,
242 N.C. 119, 86 S.E.2d 798 (1955); State v. Hackney, 240 N.C. 230, 81
S.E.2d 778 (1954).
' State v. Gibson, 229 N.C. 497, 50 S.E.2d 520 (1948).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-175 to -176 (1950), as amended, N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 1-175 (Supp. 1961).
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